By Mukurima X Muriuki (On Facebook)
One phrase my international conflict professor loved repeating was “asymmetric conflict.”
She would say that in a war where one side is vastly stronger than the other, the two sides are not actually fighting the same war.
The perceived superpower fights to win.
The perceived weaker side fights simply not to lose.
And that small difference is what ends up shaping the entire conflict.
One of the case studies we spent time on was the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, where Serbia-under Slobodan Milosevic, endured sustained strikes from the alliance
On paper the imbalance was obvious. NATO had overwhelming air superiority, superior technology, and the backing of the world’s most powerful military alliance. Serbia had no realistic path to defeating NATO militarily.
But the Serbian leadership understood the logic of asymmetric conflict. They did not need to win in the traditional sense. They only needed to survive long enough to create political fractures within NATO and impose enough cost that the alliance would eventually seek an exit.
There was also another assumption NATO planners made at the time. Many believed that sustained air strikes would trigger a popular revolt inside Serbia and lead to the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic
Ironically, the opposite happened in the short terma
The bombing initially united much of the population. Even people who disliked Milosevic rallied around the government while the country was under attack. Instead of collapsing, the regime was temporarily strengthened by the external pressure.
In Vietnam, the United States had superior technology, logistics, and firepower. But North Vietnam understood they did not need to defeat America on the battlefield. They only needed to outlast American political patience.
The same pattern unfolded again in Afghanistan. The Taliban could not defeat the United States conventionally or militarily. But the clock was their greatest weapon. Twenty years later, the insurgency was still standing while the superpower had left.
That is the core doctrine of asymmetric conflict:
a superpower loses if it does not decisively win, while the perceived weaker side can claim victory simply by surviving.
In Iran, the assumption that a quick American off-ramp is imminent ignores the political realities that shape these wars.
Wars are not fought only with missiles and aircraft. They are fought inside domestic political arenas.
If the United States were to step back from Iran while energy prices are rising and Gulf infrastructure is burning, it would NOT simply be interpreted as de-escalation. Around the world it would likely be seen as capitulation under pressure. That perception carries a strategic cost Washington may not be willing to absorb.
And in an election year, the stakes even go higher.
Which means we may now be entering the phase many asymmetric conflicts reach-the one where neither side can afford the political cost of stopping, even if the logistical and economic cost of continuing keeps rising. And history shows that this is often the most dangerous moment in a war.
Once both sides become trapped between political survival and military escalation, the conflict stops being about winning quickly and becomes about who can endure the longest without appearing to lose.
May the day break
